CHAPTER 10

THE INTERAGENCY ARENA AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL: THE CASES NOW KNOWN AS STABILITY OPERATIONS

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DEFINING THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

In the early 1980s, the American military discovered (or rediscovered) the intermediate level of war between strategy and tactics—a level that Napoleon had called "grand tactics." The U.S. Army writers of doctrine chose to describe that level of war, as did their Soviet adversaries, as the operational level. And they chose, again like the Soviets, to call the activities of that level Operational Art. This chapter addresses interagency operations at the operational level in the context of what we now call, "stability operations."[2] Therefore, we are faced with definitional tasks for both of these terms. We will address stability operations in the next section; here we will focus on the operational level.

The Department of Defense (DoD) defines the operational level as being between the strategic and the tactical and linking the two. It goes further to say that this is the level where campaigns are planned to achieve the objectives of strategy. This is fine as far as it goes, but it hardly goes far enough, especially when we are operating in an interagency context. For the United States, the interagency operational level exists where two or more separate federal agencies plan and conduct operations to achieve strategic objectives. Domestically, this may involve such activities as interdicting illicit

drugs entering the United States. Internationally, it is most commonly seen in the workings of the Country Team in an American Embassy. When discussing other states—especially those with unitary rather than federal systems—we can substitute "national" for federal agencies.

Another way of seeing the interagency operational level is in terms of task forces designed to conduct activities that are generally independent of other governmental activities. That is, these activities are relatively self-contained but designed to achieve larger strategic ends. As such, they are the mid-level building blocks of strategy. By way of contrast, the tactical level focuses on the highly interrelated tasks necessary to achieve operational objectives. Tactical organizations do not function independently or autonomously, operational ones do.

THE NATURE OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

Even though the entire history of the U.S. military is replete with almost continuous "stability operations" contrasting with less than a dozen "major wars," the military has yet to fully agree on what to call these operations. And, although it has effective doctrine,[3] it rarely reads it and even more rarely understands and remembers what it reads. In the early 20th century, these operations were known as small wars.[4] In fact, based on the lessons of the small wars in Central America and the Caribbean, the Marine Corps published its *Small Wars Manual* in 1940 on the very eve of the biggest war in history.

After World War II, the United States became engaged in combating what the Soviets called wars of national liberation and we called counterinsurgency.

Counterinsurgency—or COIN—was the term of art/choice until about 1973 when stability operations entered the doctrine. By 1981 the U.S. Army had again changed the name when it published Field Manual (FM) 100-20, *Low Intensity Conflict*.[5] Low intensity conflict (LIC) lasted as part of doctrine for only a decade, and one new edition of FM 100-20, which, although almost completely rewritten to incorporate both formal research and formal lessons learned, retained essentially the same name. One innovation was that it was jointly published with the U.S. Air Force.[6] LIC was also enshrined in federal law with the passage of the Cohen-Nunn Amendment that created the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD-SO/LIC) in 1986.

Nevertheless, the shelf life of the term in doctrine was relatively short. By 1993 LIC had been replaced by Operations Other Than War (OOTW).[7] Within 2 years of the appearance of OOTW, joint doctrine had modified the term to read Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).[8] By 1997, the Army was not happy with OOTW/MOOTW and had drafted a new FM that returned to the term stability operations, adding support operations to create the acronym, SASO.

None of these terms is really quite accurate since they all address situations where combat is either a very real probability or a reality. As the facetious saying went, "I never saw anyone killed by a low intensity bullet!" Instead, what we are talking about are civil-military operations that are conducted in environments where one or more potential adversaries operate in asymmetric relationships with their adversaries.

In 1992, Max Manwaring and this writer published an article in the journal, *Small Wars and Insurgencies*

entitled, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Toward a New Analytical Approach,” based on research conducted since 1984.[9] In that article we detailed quantitative research that identified seven dimensions that together determined the outcome of the 43 insurgencies that had involved Western powers since the end of World War II. Those seven dimensions are:

1. Military Actions of the Intervening Power;
2. Support Actions of the Intervening Power;
3. Host Government Legitimacy;
4. Degree of Outside Support to Insurgents;
5. Actions versus Subversion;
6. Host Government Military Actions; and,
7. Unity of Effort.

Although not all dimensions were individually statistically significant, the entire model correctly explained the outcome in 88 percent of the cases (38 out of 43), with a multiple R square of 0.90 and a significance level of <.001.[10] Of the five outlying cases, three were near statistical ties, while the remaining two were explained by factors unique to those cases.

While the Unity of Effort dimension was not individually statistically significant in the original quantitative study, subsequent qualitative research clearly demonstrated its importance. A study of nine cases of peace operations clearly demonstrated that Unity of Effort was one of two key dimensions about which all others revolved.[11] Unity of Effort, of course, is the aim of all interagency coordination.

The significance of this body of research that spans more than 2 decades is that the policymaker and/or operator who ignores the dimensions of the model is likely to fail in his efforts. Not that any one dimension is necessarily, of itself, critical to success or failure in

stability operations, but the side of the conflict that better addresses those dimensions is the likely victor. And, as was demonstrated by our research into peace operations, Unity of Effort is, indeed, a key to success.

It is important to note here that the research that produced the model has been incorporated into U.S. Joint and Army doctrine.[12] Despite this simple fact, it appears highly probable that institutional (institutionalized) learning has not really taken place.[13] The result is that it has been necessary for the United States to learn the same lessons again and again, as if each new stability operation were a situation that had never been encountered before. This chapter will examine that phenomenon in a series of case studies of interagency coordination in stability operations from the late 1940s to the present.

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CASES

Six cases are addressed; each attempts to show both successful and unsuccessful aspects of interagency coordination designed to achieve unity of effort. The first case examines what came to be British counterinsurgency practice born in the crucible of the Malayan Emergency. The degree to which the British approach is transferable is an open question. Vietnam, the second case, is generally an example of a command and control structure—both military and political—that was doomed from the beginning. Nevertheless, the Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) structure showed what could be accomplished in both political and military terms at the operational level. Military and political veterans of the Vietnam experience were the leaders of the U.S. effort in El Salvador during the 1980s. Even without full

unity of command, the several U.S. elements and their Salvadoran allies crafted structures and procedures that facilitated attaining unity of effort across the board. Those lessons were not lost in the "drug war," and the premier institutions for monitoring and interdiction of the drug flow to the United States through the Caribbean air and sea routes is the highly innovative Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S). With all these lessons learned (along with some others such as Somalia) the United States leaped into Iraq and tried to restore it to political, economic, and security health with an authority structure little, if at all, better than the one used in Vietnam. While the Iraq insurgency was unfolding, the long-term insurgency in Colombia was beginning to take a turn for the better. Following a suggestion from U.S. Southern Command, President Alfonso Uribe created the Coordinating Center for Integrated Action (CCAI) and made it his vehicle to achieve the required unity of effort to defeat the insurgency. The lessons of these six cases—hard won, and not without backsliding—lead to conclusions about how and why governments learn or fail to learn from their own past or the experiences of others.

The Malayan Emergency and British Practice.

Shortly after the end of World War II, the British Empire, in particular, and European colonialism in general, was challenged by a series of insurgencies. One of the earliest and longest fought was the Malayan Emergency which began in June 1948. Even though it was a rebellion almost entirely of an ethnic Chinese minority among a majority Malay population, the insurgency lasted for 12 years until it finally ended in 1960, 3 years after the new state of Malaya (now

military conflicts could be adjudicated by the Secretary of Defense, since the departure of the CPA the only person who could adjudicate those conflicts became the President. The consequences of this remain unclear, but they are certainly less than optimal.

Another problem for interagency coordination is that, unlike Vietnam, there has not been any American agency comparable to CORDS. Thus there have been no simple means of creating task organizations to undertake combined security and reconstruction missions. Civilian agencies from non-DoD departments did not work for General Casey, and military forces did not work for the U.S. ambassador. At the same time, the Iraqi government has had no incentive to create the kind of CORDS parallel structure established by Vietnamese President Thieu. The outcome of all of this has been a structure that makes interagency coordination more difficult than it needs to be resulting in very questionable unity of effort.[39]

Colombia—CCAI: How President Uribe Took a U.S. Initiative and Made it his Own.

The final case harkens back to El Salvador in terms of the American structure for interagency coordination but enters new territory with the host nation response. In Colombia, the American ambassador—as per his letter of appointment—is responsible for all actions of the U.S. Government (and U.S. Government contractors) operating in country. This includes a very much expanded USMILGP, the CIA station, the narcotics assistance section (NAS), and the DEA, among others. Included in the USMILGP is a Civil Affairs team from SOUTHCOM.

The Colombian insurgency has bedeviled that country for more than 40 years (60+ if one includes

the early stages of the *Violencia*). In that time, multiple governments have sought to deal with it in a variety of ways ranging from suppression to accommodation to addressing "root causes." The last effort at accommodation was that of the administration of President Andrés Pastrana who ceded a huge zone of the country to the guerrillas of the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC). At the end of his term, President Pastrana recognized the failure of this policy of appeasement and turned to suppression.

Concurrent with these efforts was the attempt to address the "root causes" of Colombia's insurgency. Called Plan Colombia, this was a multiyear, $7.5 billion program, $4.9 billion of which was to be financed by Colombia and $2.6 billion by international donors. The U.S. share was $1.3 billion, about $1 billion in military assistance and the remaining $300 million in development assistance. At least $1 billion in development assistance was to come from the European Union (EU). While the United States and Colombia have more than met their commitments, the EU has been less forthcoming. Unfortunately, Plan Colombia during the Pastrana administration was tied to the failed policy of accommodation, hence its results had little impact on either the insurgency or narcotrafficking.

The election of Alvaro Uribe as President in May 2002 changed the nature of the counterinsurgency in Colombia. President Uribe maintained Plan Colombia but tied it to a new military plan called Plan Patriota, designed to defeat the FARC. The military plan was to take back from the guerrillas areas of the country that had either been ceded to them as part of Pastrana's negotiating strategy or that they had simply occupied. Some of these areas were under the control of the other insurgent group, the *Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional* (ELN),

while others were controlled by illegal *Autodefensas* (the so-called paramilitaries or AUI). With regard to the latter, Uribe began an apparently successful effort to negotiate their disbanding.

As all these strategic moves were taking place, the Civil Affairs section of the SOUTHCOM operations directorate proposed an initiative to establish a Colombian interagency organization "capable of synchronizing national level efforts to reestablish governance" in areas that had been under FARC, ELN, or AUI control.[40] Civil Affairs officers attached to the MILGP in Colombia presented the concept to the Minister of Defense who liked it and made it the basis for his proposal to President Uribe in February 2004. Needless to say, the concept had been fully vetted in SOUTHCOM and the embassy, and both the commander and the ambassador totally supported the concept.

President Uribe accepted the proposal and established the Coordination Center for Integrated Action (CCAI) with one of his senior advisors and closest associates, Luis Alfonso Hoyos, as its Director. Members of the Board of Directors include Vice Minister of Defense Andres Peñate, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Freddy Padilla, and 12 other senior level representatives of key government ministries. The Board meets weekly, reporting directly to the President.[41]

CCAI is staffed full time by representatives of 13 government ministries and five supporting agencies, including both defense ministry personnel and military officers. The American embassy is also represented at CCAI by a USAID official and a Civil Affairs officer assigned to the USMILGP. CCAI's first major planning activity was a senior leader seminar and planning

session held from May 8-10, 2004, which developed an economic, social development, and security plan to reestablish long-term governance in southern Colombia. In addition to the President, seminar participants included four ministers (including the Minister of Defense), four other cabinet level civilians, both Vice Ministers of Defense, the Commander of the Colombian Armed Forces, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the commanders of the three military services and the National Police. Among the U.S. participants were Ambassador William Wood and General James T. Hill, Commander of U.S. Southern Command.[42]

Implementation of this plan was sufficiently successful that planning was expanded to address a full seven conflictive zones throughout the country. This plan was addressed at an off-site planning session in Washington at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies from March 28-31, 2005.

As President Uribe has developed CCAI, it is the ideal operational instrument for winning the peace in Colombia's counterinsurgency. First, it is a vehicle designed to achieve a specific strategic objective, that of reestablishing legitimate governance over zones formerly controlled by insurgents or the AUI. Second, its Director, Luis Alfonso Hoyos, has the authority he requires to direct the ministries and agencies involved to carry out the plan. For this, the president holds him accountable. And, third, CCAI brings together all the relevant stakeholders to participate in the planning process thereby ensuring "buy in"; this includes the American embassy, firmly under the direction of the ambassador, with the full support of U.S. Southern Command.

CONCLUSION

When this project began, it did not include any formal hypotheses. Rather, it was developed around six cases that could illustrate the range of issues for interagency coordination and unity of effort at the operational level. The cases were selected largely in terms of their success or failure in achieving unity of effort and not so much in terms of their degree of success in terms of the overall strategic objective. By these criteria, JIATF-S is highly successful in achieving operational unity of effort regardless of its ability to affect the flow of illicit drugs into the United States.

Prior explorations of the unity of effort dimension suggested that, if it were possible, it was desirable to have that particular subset of unity of effort called unity of command. However, there obviously were many instances where unity of command was not possible, and, therefore, one would often have to settle for unity of effort brought about by various mechanisms of interagency coordination. In addition, especially with respect to stability operations, there is most often a multinational aspect that complicates the achievement of unity of effort regardless of whether or not there is unity of command at any level.

The examination of these six cases results in one obvious conclusion. Where there was unity of command, there was unity of effort and effective interagency coordination, not otherwise. Unity of command on the U.S. side of a multinational stability operation also made multinational unity of effort more likely and easier to achieve.

The Malayan Emergency clearly demonstrates the importance of unity of command but it also shows the criticality of the concept of the objective. Without a

strategic objective, the best operational plan had little likelihood of mission success. Nor would General Templar have accomplished his mission or achieved so high a degree of unity of effort without the strategic objective of an independent Malaya. Given that objective, the Briggs Plan to coordinate operations and tactical actions, and Templar with full authority, the Malayan Emergency ended well.

Vietnam, by contrast, demonstrates that the lack of a clear objective, confused and overlapping chains of command, and lack of authority on the ground make it difficult at best to attain unity of effort within the American government let alone with our allies. The establishment of CORDS shows what can be done to effect solid interagency coordination when a position of authority is created and the several involved agencies understand who is the boss. When Ambassador Robert Komer and his successors spoke, they knew they would be backed up by COMUSMACV. That fact made it easier for the Vietnamese to construct a parallel organization with similar authority, and meant that the Deputy Commander for CORDS only had to coordinate with his Vietnamese counterpart to achieve unity of effort for the pacification program. Unfortunately, the U.S. Government has never internalized the lessons of CORDS—neither in the military as a whole nor in the State Department.

Ambassador David Passage characterizes interagency coordination in both the Country Team and in Washington as "a mess,"[43] despite the fact that as Chargé d'Affaires of the American embassy in El Salvador between the departure of Ambassador Thomas Pickering and the arrival of Ambassador Edwin Corr, he filled the commander role brilliantly. Thus, the El Salvador and Colombia cases demonstrate

the effectiveness of the ambassadorial appointment letter and Country Team concept for achieving unity of command among American agencies. Given ambassadors who take their role of directing all U.S. Government activity in the country to which they are accredited seriously, then the authority provided by the appointment letter and the Country Team mechanism serves well to bring about unity of action to achieve a defined strategic objective.

The evolution of JIATF-S suggests that the Joint Interagency Task Force, whose Director is, in fact, a commander, is an appropriate organization to coordinate the activity of many interagency players. It is of note that so far, at least, all JIATF directors have been military—either Navy or Coast Guard. But there is no reason that the next director of a JIATF, either already in existence or to be created for some future purpose, could not be drawn from a civilian agency or department having the requisite expertise needed for the mission.

Iraq suggests that much of what we should have learned over the last half-century, or more, simply went unlearned. While we have done quite well in learning what has been called elsewhere "the joint game," Iraq demonstrates how far we still have to go in learning the "interagency game." Why, with all the experience we have had with stability operations, are we unable, or unwilling, to simply designate one American official—civilian or military—where there is a large and ongoing military operation as being in charge of all U.S. Government activity? Specifically, during the CPA period, why was not Ambassador Bremer, or General Abizaid, or Lieutenant General Sanchez simply given the authority to conduct all U.S. Government activity in Iraq and then held accountable? Since the CPA went

out of business, why has neither General Casey nor the American ambassador been given that responsibility and the requisite authority? In the words of the King of Siam, "It is a puzzlement."

Finally, the case of CCAI in Colombia shows both how the American supporting effort can be enhanced by effective unity of command under the ambassador, and how an effective leader like President Uribe can take somebody else's good idea, make it his own, and create an effective national structure with unity of command to achieve unity of effort. What makes CCAI both unique and exciting is that it retains the principle of unity of command, while at the same time making certain that all the critical institutional stakeholders have voice and vote. Thus, CCAI is, perhaps, a model for the future organization of operational level interagency actions.

POSTSCRIPT—U.S. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

Recently, the State Department has created an Office of Coordination for Reconstruction and Stability Operations, and the National Security Council, Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on Reconstruction and Stabilization (R&S) has developed an action plan for interagency management of reconstruction and stabilization operations.[44] Two of the three model organizations proposed in this action plan are relevant to the subject of this chapter. One is the planning cell called a Humanitarian Reconstruction and Stabilization Team (HRST) that will be deployed on request of the regional combatant commander to the combatant command to augment his Plans Division with civilian R&S planning capability. The other proposed

organization is an Advanced Civilian Team (ACT) for field management and coordination.

> It is expected that multiple ACTs would deploy to various provinces or geographic sectors in a country. Under a combat scenario, the ACTs provide immediate civilian presence to work with military commanders, conduct assessments, engage local authorities, coordinate with international programs, initiate programs in the field, and prepare for longer-term civilian programs. Under a non-combat scenario, the ACTs provide similar functions, advising an Ambassador or Chief of Mission and supporting a headquarters ACT staff that augments Embassy operations and coordinates provincial level ACTs.[45]

Although these organizations are highly relevant to the success of stability operations—in much the same manner as the Briggs committees were in Malaya—they do not directly address the main point of this chapter: *unity of command*.

In the case of the HRST, unity of command is not an issue. It works for the combatant commander as an augmentation of his Plans Division. Neither is unity of command an issue with respect to the noncombat scenario ACT. It works for the Ambassador/Chief of Mission. Unity of command is an issue in the combat scenario ACT which *works with military commanders.* The issue is clearly, "Who is in charge?" If this is not spelled out, then the achievement of unity of effort at the operational level is likely to be less than optimal, as the case studies of this chapter have pointed out.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10

1. The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not represent the views of CHDS, the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

2. The names keep changing. Current U.S. Army Doctrine calls them "stability operations," although there are some who want to add "reconstruction." For a tour of the name game, see John T. Fishel, "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, The GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night," *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement*, Vol. 4, No. 3, Winter 1995, pp. 372-398.

3. What the military calls doctrine is a distillation of operational lessons, tactics, techniques, and procedures that are written into training manuals and provide the ways in which military operations are normally conducted. Doctrine provides the underlying concept of "train as you fight." Civilian organizations claim not to have doctrine but, in fact, have something equivalent. Today, the business term of art is "best practices."

4. C. E. Caldwell, *Small Wars Manual*, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1940, republished 1987.

5. FM 100-20, *Low Intensity Conflict*, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Washington, DC, 1981.

6. Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 3-20, FM 100-20, *Low Intensity Conflict*, HQDAF, HQDA, Washington, DC, 1990.

7. FM 100-5, *Operations*, HQDA, Washington, DC, 1993.

8. Joint Pub 3.0, *Operations*, HQCJCS, Washington, DC, 2008.

9. *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 3, No. 3, Winter 1992, Frank Cass, London, UK, pp. 272-310.

10. For those who do not understand the statistics: multiple R squared of 0.90 means that the outcome is explained (varies with) the seven dimensions 90 percent of the time; a p of < (less than) 0.001 means that this result could have happened by chance alone less than one time in 10,000.

11. Max G. Manwaring and Kimbra L. Fishel, "Lessons That Should Have Been Learned: Toward a Theory of Engagement for 'The Savage Wars of Peace'," in John T. Fishel, ed., *The Savage Wars of Peace: Toward a New Paradigm of Peace Operations*, Boulder,

CO: Westview Press, 1999, p. 205. The other key dimension was legitimacy.

12. See John T. Fishel, "War by Other Means," in Fishel, ed., *The Savage Wars of Peace,* pp. 6-8.

13. See Richard Duncan Downie, *Learning from Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War,* Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998.

14. Sam C. Sarkesian, *Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, p. 71.

15. Donald Mackay, *The Malayan Emergency 1948-60: The Domino that Stood*, London, UK: Brassey's, 1997, p. 86.

16. *Ibid*., p. 89.

17. *Ibid*.

18. John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001, p. 87.

19. *Ibid*., p. 88.

20. *Ibid*.

21. *Ibid*., p. 89.

22. Sarkesian, p. 159.

23. *Ibid*.

24. Nagl, p. 165.

25. Quoted in *Ibid*., p. 166.

26. John D. Waghelstein, "Military-to-Military Contacts: Personal Observations—The El Salvador Case," *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement*, Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer 2001, pp. 1-45.

27. Waghelstein, pp. 29–30.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

30. The author witnessed these coordination efforts first hand while assigned as the Executive Officer of the Combined ESAF Assessment Team during 1987 and 1988.

31. Personal communication from Ambassador Corr.

32. Waghelstein, p. 22.

33. Ronald Reagan, NSDD 221, *Narcotics and National Security*, April 8, 1986, p. 3.

34. George H. W. Bush, NSD 18, *International Counternarcotics Strategy*, August 21, 1989, p. 3.

35. James Jay Carafano, "A Better Way to Fight Terrorism," *www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,156732,00*, May 18, 2005.

36. The analogy with Vietnam *only* applies to the issue of interagency coordination and the related principle of unity of effort. For a more complete discussion of my analysis of stability operations in Iraq, see Chapter 14 of John T. Fishel and Max G. Manwaring, *Uncomfortable Wars Revisited*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005.

37. See Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, New York: Regan Books, 2004, especially pp. 389, 419-425, 523-530.

38. Quoted by Walter Pincus in *Washington Post,* "Memo: U.S. Lacked Full Postwar Iraq Plan," June 12, 2005, pp. A1, A22.

39. Another problem of coordination in Iraq is between U.S. forces and nongovernmental agencies, especially contractors, and even more especially armed military support contractors. Coordination with entities of these kinds brings us into the

realm of what is coming to be called "Integrated Operations." See Richard D. Downie, "Defining Integrated Operations," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Third Quarter, 2005, pp. 10-14. On June 13, 2005, National Public Radio's Morning Edition did a story about the problems of coordination between the Marines and some armed contractors who the Marines detained after an apparent "blue on blue" firefight.

40. USSOUTHCOM briefing paper, "Colombian Coordination Center for Integrated Action," October 19, 2004.

41. *Ibid*.

42. *Ibid*.

43. Multiple iterations of Ambassador David Passage's lecture to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Officer Course between 1992 and 1997.

44. PCC on Reconstruction & Stabilization, *Overview and Action Plan: Interagency Management of Reconstruction & Stabilization Operations: Models for Planning, Management & Deployment*, unclassified, no date. This postscript is drawn from the above document.

45. *Ibid*., p. 3.